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The securitisation of avian influenza:
international discourses and domestic politics
in Asia
MELISSA G. CURLEY AND JONATHAN HERINGTON*
Abstract. Infectious disease outbreaks primarily aﬀect communities of individuals with little
reference to the political borders which contain them; yet, the state is still the primary
provider of public health capacity. This duality has profound eﬀects for the way disease is
framed as a security issue, and how international organisations, such as the World Health
Organization, assist aﬀected countries. The article seeks to explore the role that domestic
political relationships play in mediating the treatment of diseases as security issues. Drawing
upon an analysis of the securitisation of avian influenza in Vietnam and Indonesia, the
article discusses the eﬀect that legitimacy, competing referents and audiences have on the
external and internal policy reactions of states to infectious diseases, specifically in their
interpretation of disease as a security threat. In doing so, we extend upon existing debates
on the Copenhagen School’s securitisation framework, particularly on the impact of
domestic political structures on securitisation processes in non-Western, non-democratic and
transitional states.
Melissa G. Curley is Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Political
Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia. Prior to this
she was Research Oﬃcer at the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong from
1999–2005. Her research and teaching interests include East Asian International Relations,
non-traditional and human security discourse in IR theory and practice, and civil society
and democratisation in Southeast Asia. Her most recent book is Security and Migration in
Asia. The dynamics of securitisation, coedited with Wong Siu-lun (Routledge, 2008).
Jonathan Herington is currently studying for his doctorate in International Relations and
ethics at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, The Australian National
University. His research interests include the security implications of infectious disease
emergencies, the ethics of securitising infectious diseases and security as a value. He holds
a Bachelor of Science and Bachelor of Arts (Honours) from the University of Queensland.
Major outbreaks of infectious disease aﬀect communities of individuals with little
reference to the political borders overlaid upon them. Although this has always
been the case, the rapid pace of globalisation has meant that in recent times
regional disease epidemics are no longer contained by even those natural borders,
such as oceans and mountain ranges, which once were eﬀective. Some infectious
* The authors would like to acknowledge Sara E. Davies and Martin Weber for their comments on
a previous version, as well as the contributions of three anonymous reviewers.
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diseases can now travel at a frightening pace around the world, spurred on by the
frequency of trade and the speed of air travel. Public health practitioners have
advocated that the problems raised by the globalisation of infectious disease should
be addressed with global solutions.1 However, the state remains the most
significant actor within the political arena of global public health protection and
the guardian of the resources and organisational capacity to respond eﬀectively.
Motivating states to respond to emergent infectious disease threats, such as avian
influenza, is thus seen as critical to the maintenance of global public health.
Some, both academics and policy-makers, have argued that the securitisation of
health is the most eﬃcacious way to garner resources and attention to global
strategies for disease control.2 The great potential of constructing infectious disease
as a security issue is that it promises the appropriation of considerable resources
for the defence of people’s well-being; regardless of a state’s attitude to public
health. The argument proceeds that all states value security, whether or not they
value the health of their citizens. While there is a strong case to be made for such
a claim, there are also significant caveats which we believe are borne out in the
study of empirical cases.
This article begins with the premise that the securitisation of health issues
within the international community cannot be treated as a monolithic process. The
domestic political and social context within states drives their responses to
infectious disease as much, or more so, than the international discourse of health
security. A corresponding gulf has emerged between the hopes of the developed
world, who initiated the global securitisation of health, and the actions taken by
some countries in the developing world. States thus respond to infectious disease
emergencies in diverse (and potentially unproductive) ways, even when they
embrace the language of security.
Although the literature contains a number of theoretical deconstructions of the
link between security and health, empirical analyses of key cases remain scarce. To
this end, we examine the case of avian influenza in Vietnam and Indonesia against
the backdrop of the international discourse. Drawing from the Copenhagen
School’s securitisation framework, we analyse the process of securitisation within
two countries to present empirical data on how the ostensible shift towards the
securitisation of infectious disease is being operationalised in countries facing
infectious disease emergencies. The empirical case analysis interrogates how local
securitisation processes, that aim to operationalise international public health
discourses, rely on fragile state legitimacy, use competing referents and utilise
language that is heavily contingent upon the audience to which they are appealing.
We suggest that the analysis of such facilitating conditions when studying
securitisation processes promotes insights which help us to understand the policy
challenges of implementing the global discourse of infectious disease securitisation
at the domestic level.
In forwarding the argument, the article is structured into five main sections.
The first reviews recent debates linking infectious disease with security; by
1 Robin A Weiss and Anthony J. McMichael, ‘Social and environmental risk factors in the emergence
of infectious diseases’, Nature Medicine, 10 (2004).
2 Laurie Garrett, HIV and National Security: Where are the Links? (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 2005); and Peter Piot, ‘Global AIDS Pandemic: Time to Turn the Tide’, Science, 288
(2000).
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interrogating discussions on which conditions facilitate disease securitisation, and
by identifying gaps within the literature on the types of audiences which are present
in that process at the domestic and international level. The second section presents
key themes present in recent literature on securitisation processes in non-Western
and non-democratic or transitional contexts. Here we review two main aspects of
pertinent critiques of securitisation, namely its Eurocentricism, and its focus on
linguistic speech act methodology, to establish important conceptual parameters
for our discussion of empirical cases in Southeast Asia. The third section presents
the empirical cases of Vietnam and Indonesia, focusing on the social and political
context in shaping the securitisation process within these polities. Section four
discusses how analyses of political legitimacy, domestic referents and audience
interaction facilitate greater understanding of the securitisation process, particu-
larly in non-Western, non-democratic and transitional states. Finally, we explore
the article’s implications for the global public health securitisation agenda, and the
role of domestic political structures within the securitisation framework.
Disease as a security issue
Most recent scholarship on disease and security has focused on the context in
which disease becomes a security issue. However it has done so by focusing on
which diseases have security potential, rather than the socio-political environment
in which these securitisations occur. Traditionally, diseases have been the subject
of security analysis when they have had an eﬀect on the relative power of the state,
particularly during conflict. Conversely, advocates of human security, particularly
those of the ‘freedom from want’ agenda, have proposed that almost any disease
is a potential security threat due to its ability to significantly aﬀect the quality of
life of an individual.3 Such paradigms have sought to establish the objective
‘security-ness’ of disease, and play an important role in making sense of the
arguments forwarded by actors, but they oﬀer little analytical utility when seeking
to explain the interplay between the global and local politics of infectious disease
control.
Following the Copenhagen School’s work on securitisation, we believe that the
crucial component in seeking to understand the plurality of policies is whether the
disease can credibly be termed a security issue and hence be accepted by an
audience as an existential threat to a referent object.4 According to Buzan, Wæver
and de Wilde this requires that a set of ‘facilitating conditions’ be met in order for
the disease to be credible as a security issue. Thus coherent analyses of the subject
must be able to form a rationale for why some disease outbreaks are accepted as
security issues, while others are not.
For the most part, these rationales have focused on the diseases themselves, and
have tended to overlook diﬀerences between the disease-aﬀected communities.
McInnes suggests that, amongst other facilitating conditions, in order for a disease
3 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York: Commission on Human
Security, 2003), p. 96.
4 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis (London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 25.
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to be successfully securitised: ‘it must be perceived as an extreme threat to social
well being, going beyond the individual to the community’.5 A key factor which
accelerates this process is the degree to which Western, developed societies have
become ‘individuated’, creating a heightened perception of uncertainty and risk
surrounding disease.6 Enemark provides a complementary explanation, positing
that: ‘the health threats most suitable for securitisation are outbreaks of infec-
tious diseases – specifically, those that inspire a level of dread disproportionate to
their ability to cause illness and death’.7 Such pronouncements tend to produce a
list of candidate maladies, which include: SARS, HIV/AIDS, Ebola, variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) and pandemic influenza.8
While McInnes and Enemark’s exploration of fear’s role in securitising disease
might correctly identify which diseases are securitised, it raises an equally important
question: in whom do these diseases inspire dread? How do audiences come to fear
these diseases and view them as security threats? McInnes’ emphasis on the ‘risk
society’ is a well rounded dissection of how certain diseases become securitised
within the developed world, but it is unclear what utility it possesses outside of risk
societies, or even outside of the Western-context.9 While McInnes has therefore
dealt with the ‘facilitating conditions’ which inform the reaction of a developed
world audience to securitising attempts, the lack of a systemic discussion on the
role of audiences within his framework hampers the applicability of the analysis to
non-risk society contexts.
Audiences, be they groups of individuals or communities, are widely divergent
in the way that they understand threats and the way they become fearful. For
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, the audience is the primary judge of whether an issue
warrants security attention, and in order for that imprimatur to be given, the
securitising actor must convince the audience that the issue represents an existential
threat to a referent they value.10 This process, as we discuss below and as is
recounted in detail elsewhere, should not be understood as merely an act of
persuasion; there are critical questions of social structuring and linguistic legiti-
macy which inform this process. It is important to note, however, that within
securitisation studies generally, the role that the audience plays in the construction
of threats is seldom acknowledged, and its relationship to the state, the threat
5 Other facilitating conditions posited by McInnes suggest that in order for a disease to be recognised
as a security issue: ‘it must have substantial political eﬀect; it cannot be dealt with nationally or has
implications beyond national borders; and it has legitimacy as a security issue – a claim is made that
the issue can be presented as a threat in security terms.’ (emphasis in original); Kelley Lee and Colin
McInnes, ‘A conceptual framework for research and policy’, in Ingram (ed.), Health, Foreign Policy
and Security: Towards a Conceptual Framework for Research and Policy (London: Nuﬃeld Trust,
2004), p. 15.
6 Colin McInnes, Health, Security and the Risk Society (London: The Nuﬃeld Trust, 2005), p. 13; Bill
Durodié, ‘The Concept of Risk’ (London: The Nuﬃeld Trust, 2005).
7 Christian Enemark, Disease and Security: Natural Plagues and Biological Weapons in East Asia
(London: Routledge, 2007), p. 8.
8 Excluding HIV/AIDS, these diseases account for a very small number of deaths when compared to
malaria, cholera or tuberculosis, see Roger I Glass, ‘Perceived Threats and Real Killers’, Science, 304
(2004).
9 For the limits of the risk society, see Ulrich Beck, Living in the World Risk Society, Speech delivered
15 February 2006, London School of Economics and Political Science, London. Transcript available
at: {http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/events/2006/20051215t1424z001.
htm} accessed on 17 September 2008, p. 18.
10 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, Security, p. 31.
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being constructed, and the securitising actor is rarely analysed.11 The focus has
rather been on the securitising actor (what speech they use, how they securitise)
and the objective facets of threats which make them conducive to securitising
processes.
In line with this critique of securitisation theory, a growing body of literature,
from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, has questioned the ability of
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s framework to adequately incorporate the social and
political context within which securitisation processes occur. Two aspects of the
critique of the securitisation framework are useful in our discussion of disease and
health. The first relates generally to the Eurocentricism and ‘democratic bias’ of the
framework, which suggests that processes of securitisation proceed in diﬀerent, and
possibly non-linear and more fragmented ways, than in democratic systems. The
second relates to securitisation’s supposed over-emphasis on linguistic speech acts
as the primary evidence to locate cases of securitisation, neglecting other
potentially viable and important non-verbal ways in which the audience responds
to the securitising goals of the state.
We believe, along with others,12 that supplementary concepts – such as
non-verbal forms of political communication – do not pose a methodological
challenge to the fundamental concept of securitisation per se. However, we suggest
that the application of a purely linguistic analysis in non-democratic and
transitional East Asian contexts does not adequately take into account the specific
negotiated relationships between the ‘audience’ and political elites (or senders and
receivers of speech acts), such that corresponding analysis of empirical cases are
devoid of hermeneutic depth and recognition of the situated audience. The article
does not attempt to undertake an exhaustive analysis of the degree of, and factors
responsible for, H5N1 securitisation in the case studies. Rather the comparative
case analysis informs our argument about the need to better understand the
complexity of audience situatedness in the process of securitising infectious disease,
specifically in relation to the interplay between global public health discourse and
its impact on, and implementation within, the state. In sum then, our critique is
directed towards the analytical prejudices of securitisation theory, using empirical
insights from cases in Southeast Asia to support our contention.
Securitisation studies in non-Western/non-democratic contexts
Critiques of the securitisation framework are not new and an extensive review of
these theoretical discussions can be found elsewhere.13 More attention has been
paid in recent debates to the application of securitisation outside the European
11 Thierry Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context’,
European Journal of International Relations, 11 (2005), p. 182.
12 Holger Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond’, European Journal of
International Relations, 13 (2007), p. 369.
13 Lene Hansen, ‘The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the
Copenhagen School’, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 29 (2000); and Bill McSweeney,
‘Durkheim and the Copenhagen school: A response to Buzan and Wæver’, Review of International
Studies, 24 (1998); Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, enemies: Securitization and International
Politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 47 (2003).
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context. Critiques relating to the framework’s Eurocentricism – and the fact that
little work has been done on processes of securitisation in non-Western, non-
democratic, or indeed Asian contexts – are becoming more apparent. Wilkinson for
example has argued that despite claims to the contrary, the Copenhagen School is
yet to escape what she calls the ‘Westphalian straitjacket’ because of an
institutionalised Eurocentricism.14 This is most obvious she argues when the
Euro-American model of the state and its political culture are assumed to be valid
globally. The model assumes the presence of democratic processes, where ‘the
“state” and “society” take on a normative dimension, the assumption being that
they can be used directly and are understood in “Western” rather than local terms
and contexts’.15 An important methodological implication is that when expecta-
tions of securitisation theory meet empirical evidence, this so-called straitjacket
‘acts as an editor, highlighting similarities to the Euro-American model, rephrasing
to better suit Western understanding and excising specificities deemed irrelevant to
the Western model’.16
These recent debates have been explored empirically for example in the context
of post-Soviet Russia and USSR successor states,17 newly independent Central
Asian states,18 and in South Asia in relation to Bangladeshi migrants to India.19
Common themes of these works illustrate that the state is by no means a unitary
actor, and there remain various influences over state policy and its capacity to
implement security policy. Furthermore, multiple sources of ‘threats’ compete for
attention as referent objects of security within the state apparatus. In some cases
defining the referent object of security in post-colonial and transitional states
becomes a reflection of wider contestations over state-building and other internal
power struggles between competing social groups and elites.20 The implications of
competing referent objects for the securitisation of infectious disease will be taken
up later in the case study analysis and in the conclusion.
While Buzan and Waever’s work, Regions and Powers (2003), goes some way
to recognise the need for securitisation theory to be more fluid – by emphasising
the importance of diverse security sectors and levels of analysis – its overall focus
has been criticised for paying scant attention to actually developing those ideas.21
As Hoogensen suggests, while Buzan and Waever argue that ‘leaders and peoples
have considerable freedom to determine what they do and do not define as security
threats [. . .] these ideas receive little attention [. . .] because these dynamics largely
transcend traditional, state-based security thinking (whether from above or from
14 Claire Wilkinson, ‘The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable
Outside Europe?’, Security Dialogue, 38 (2007), p. 8.
15 Ibid., p. 7.
16 Ibid.
17 Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong, ‘Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from
Post-Communism’, Politics and Society, 30 (2002).
18 Kathleen Collins, ‘Clans, Pacts and Politics in Central Asia’, Journal of Democracy, 13 (2002); and
Nicole Jackson, ‘Human Traﬃcking in Post-Soviet Central Asia: A Critique of the Securitisation
Framework’, in Curley and Siu-lun (eds), Security and Migration in Asia: The Dynamics of
Securitisation (London: Routledge, 2008).
19 Priyankar Upadhyaya, ‘Securitisation Matrix in South Asia; Bangladeshi Migrants as Enemy
Aliens’, in Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya (eds), Non-Traditional Security in Asia.
Dilemmas in Securitization (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
20 Ibid.
21 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Society
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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below).’22 The implication is that other levels and forms of politics (such as
clan ties, personal networks of influence, and informal regime behaviour) need to
be incorporated methodologically when analysing the production of security
discourses.
This resonates particularly within the context of Indonesia, where a geographi-
cally fragmented state faces the challenge of implementing health policies uniformly
over provinces, and where local political relationships may hinder or render
national level policy dictates ineﬀectual. As in many transitional and post-colonial
state contexts, the degree of communication possible between state elites and
citizens at the grassroots level varies. Divergences in socio-economic and political
conditions clearly impact on state-civil society relations, and the capacity and
ability of citizens to protest and voice opinions over state security speech acts. The
degree to which one can say that an ‘audience’ accepts securitising speech acts in
these polities is challenged by the nature and ‘volume’ of the communication of the
existential threat. This in turn can be limited by state responses, geographical
distance, and political willingness on the part of local oﬃcials.
The second major critique of relevance is securitisation’s emphasis on linguistic
speech acts as the main vehicle for identifying and validating cases of securitisation.
Like others, we argue that an overly linguistic rule-generating approach to
determining securitisation marginalises the ways in which the audience responds to,
and resists or ignores, securitising attempts by the state, or an international
organisation. As Balzacq notes, securitisation is perhaps better understood as a
‘strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration
of circumstances, including the context, psycho-cultural disposition of the audience,
and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction’.23 Balzacq’s
aim is to relocate securitisation away from speech act theory, which he believes is
theoretically unsuited to dealing comprehensively with the audience-centred nature
of the construction process.24
The debate about domestic context and securitisation fundamentally relates to
the question of audience acceptance – an important part of how securitisation is
identified and validated.25 Vuori has been interested in examining how the
securitisation framework’s dichotomy of ‘normal’ and ‘special’ (or security) politics
functions in non-democratic contexts.26 He notes that the definition of ‘audience
acceptance’ in the Copenhagen school’s work on securitisation is left ‘undefined’.27
He argues that understanding the dynamics of securitisation in non-democratic
political orders – via his empirical work on China – is crucial if securitisation
theory is to be a theory about security discourse formation. Like Wilkinson,
he argues securitisation has a bias towards democratic decision-making systems
and that it is tempting to believe that ‘special politics’ is not applicable to
22 Gunhild Hoogensen, ‘Bottoms Up! A Toast to Regional Security’, International Studies Review, 7
(2005), pp. 271–2.
23 Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context’, p. 172.
24 Ibid., p. 180.
25 Ibid., p. 184.
26 Juha A. Vuori, ‘Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of
Securitisation to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders’, European Journal of International
Relations, 14 (2008).
27 Ibid., p. 69.
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non-democratic systems because ‘there are no democratic process to begin with’.28
On the contrary, he argues that non-democratic systems also need to justify and
participate in securitising rhetoric, because the desire for political legitimacy is a
common factor across both democratic and non-democratic systems.29
Furthermore, recent work on securitisation in Asia suggests that it is diﬃcult
to define the location of ‘normal’ political practice in post-colonial states.30
Separating ‘security’ politics from ‘normal’ politics is problematic when they
appear at times to be mutually constitutive.31 Vuori, for example, criticises the
category of ‘special’ politics, asserting that, what this ‘special’ kind of politics
means has ‘largely been left undefined’ by the Copenhagen School.32 He usefully
suggests that special politics has conceptual utility in non-democratic systems, in
that it does not necessarily have to represent securitisation in terms of ‘breaking
rules’ (read democratic ones); but rather that in totalitarian socialist systems such
as China and Vietnam, ‘struggle and antagonistic contradiction among enemies
can sometimes be considered “normal” politics, or politics following the “rules”’.33
Furthermore, his use of Kluver’s work on the three diﬀerent audiences for
propaganda in China can tentatively identify diﬀerent audiences in Vietnam for
application in our case analysis. These are: ‘(1) oﬃcials for whom oﬃcial language
is a game and a tool for social impact, (2) intellectuals for whom oﬃcial
language is a tool of aggression and defence, and (3) the masses for whom oﬃcial
languages is transformatory, it legitimates and delegitimates diﬀerent forms of
action.’34 Although we analyse security discourses around infectious disease and
not party propaganda, these categorisations help to diﬀerentiate between audience
types within Vietnam’s authoritarian domestic political structure, which is mark-
edly diﬀerent from that analysed in the democratising, transitional state of
Indonesia.
In sum, this brief review has illustrated that when considering the securitisation
of international health discourses in domestic contexts, one must take into account
local factors which impact on the process of securitisation. Here, critiques of
securitisation methodology illustrate two points. Firstly, that caution must be paid
to how securitisation proceeds in non-democratic systems; in terms of the ability
and capacity of citizens to understand and then ‘accept’ securitising rhetoric, but
also in analysing the motives that elites have in securitising disease. Secondly,
emphasis on the speech act alone to identify and validate health securitisation
omits other potentially useful sources of action/resistance. These are in addition to
28 Ibid., p. 68.
29 Ibid.
30 See Ibid; Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya (eds), Non-traditional security
in Asia: dilemmas in securitization (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); and Melissa Curley and Siu-lun Wong
(eds), Security and Migration in Asia: The Dynamics of Securitisation (London: Routledge, 2008).
31 Joseph Liow, ‘Malaysia’s Approach to Indonesian Migrant Labour: Securitization, Politics, or
Catharsis?’, in Caballero-Anthony, Emmers and Acharya (eds), Non-Traditional Security in Asia:
Dilemmas in Securitization (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); see also Introduction, Conclusion and chapter
by Elizabeth Wishnick, ‘The Securitisation of Chinese Migration to the Russian Far East’, in Curley
and Siu-lun (eds), Security and Migration in Asia: The Dynamics of Securitisation (London:
Routledge, 2008).
32 Vuori, ‘Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization’, p. 69.
33 Ibid. This is precisely the contradiction identified in Joseph Liow’s critique of the securitisation
framework in his examination of Malaysia’s approach to Indonesian migrant labour Liow,
‘Malaysia’s Approach to Indonesian Migrant Labour’, pp. 61–2.
34 Vuori, ‘Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization’, p. 70.
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other contextual factors, such as geo-political considerations and state-periphery
relations, which in turn are interconnected to methods of internal state communi-
cation and control. The discussion of ‘normal’ and ‘security’ politics suggests that
attempts to locate and ‘prove’ that international health norms have been securitised
face considerable complexity in the face of the above factors.
The WHO and the ‘Health Security’ agenda
The WHO and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) are the two
primary international organisations charged with providing technical advice and
assistance to avian influenza aﬀected countries. Additionally, the Global Influenza
Surveillance Network (GISN), whose technical laboratories are located primarily in
a small number of developed states and which is coordinated by the WHO,
provides the scientific support and surveillance infrastructure for monitoring the
spread of the disease.35 Importantly, the surveillance aspect of this network
primarily relies upon the cooperation of member states in notifying the WHO or
OIE when outbreaks in either humans or animals occur.36 This network, along
with the WHO and OIE more generally, form the basis of the international
community’s assistance and coordination network for avian influenza.
Although a number of discourses operate within global health governance,37 the
WHO and GISN have recently seen a marked shift in the rhetoric which guides
their response to infectious disease emergencies, such as pandemic influenza. With
its roots in earlier debates surrounding human security, and spurred on by the
securitisation of HIV/AIDS in the late 1990s and the emergence of SARS in 2002,
the securitisation of infectious disease emergencies has become one of the dominant
features of global health governance.38 The 2007 World Health Report, entitled A
Safer Future: Global Public Health Security in the 21st Century, entrenches the link
between the language of security and the practice of public health within the global
health governance agenda.39 Focusing on emerging microbial threats and cata-
strophic disasters it embraces security language, a threat assessment methodology
and even a ‘security aesthetic’ (see, for instance, the stamped stencil motif
throughout the report, reminiscent of military intelligence reports). The creation of
the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) in 2002, coupled
with an expansion of the powers of the WHO under the revised International
Health Regulations of 2005, have also been suggested as key signs of increasing
35 Kelley Lee and David P Fidler, ‘Avian and pandemic influenza: Progress and problems with health
governance’, Global Public Health, 2 (2007), p. 218.
36 Recent advances within the International Health Regulations, although extending the WHO’s
powers, do not fundamentally change the reliance on states to accurately report see Ibid., p. 221.
37 Kelley Lee, ‘Understandings of global health governance: the contested landscape’ in Kay and
Williams (eds), Global Health Governance: Crisis, Institutions and Political Economy (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
38 Sara E Davies, ‘Securitizing Infectious Disease’, International Aﬀairs, 84 (2008); and Stefan Elbe,
‘Should HIV/AIDS be securitized? The ethical dilemmas of linking HIV/AIDS and security’,
International Studies Quarterly, 50 (2006).
39 World Health Organisation, World Health Report 2007: A Safer Future – Global Public Health
Security in the 21st Century (Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2007).
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securitisation.40 Accompanying this change in the global health governance
discourse have been similar shifts in the national policies of many developed
nations to incorporate a significant security dimension into their health initia-
tives.41 These developments amongst the international community have been of
critical importance in generating a strong link between infectious disease and
security amongst a wider cross-section of policy practitioners than was previously
the case.
Few accounts have analysed how this discourse has been operationalised in
countries aﬀected by an epidemic that threatens international public health.42 To
address this gap, we evaluate the response of Vietnam and Indonesia, to the
outbreak of H5N1 influenza amongst their poultry. In analysing to what degree,
and which, domestic factors account for variance in response to the securitisation
of global public health, we examine bureaucratic and community resistance,
core-periphery relations and socio-political discourses as variables that impact on
the state’s capacity and motivation to securitise infectious disease.
Vietnam, Indonesia and the control of avian influenza
Vietnam and Indonesia provide useful contexts in which to interrogate the
universality of the construction of security issues as is usually modelled in the
paradigmatic version of securitisation studies. Neither case is a liberal democratic
state of the type frequently present in European securitisation studies. In this sense,
they provide a good opportunity to test some of the theoretical critiques and
innovations enumerated above. It should be noted that by focusing on Southeast
Asian states we do not deny that the process of constructing security in Western
democratic states could be similarly fraught and contested. Nor should this article
be viewed as an exhaustive study of securitisation in non-democratic contexts. We
therefore merely view the following cases as suggestive of theoretical silences which
studies of securitisation in non-democratic, transitional and non-Western contexts
must be careful to examine.
From a methodological point of view, Indonesia and Vietnam provide fertile
ground for comparison of moves to securitise infectious disease. Both are
developing countries with high growth economies and large populations, the
demographics of which are changing from largely agrarian to urbanised societies.43
Both have significant poultry sectors and a history of subsistence farming using
poultry as a basis.44 Most importantly, both nations have been, at diﬀering times,
40 Davies, ‘Securitising infectious disease’. p. 301.
41 Lee and Fidler, ‘Avian and pandemic influenza’, p. 221.
42 The majority of studies have focused on the discourse in developed countries or at the international
level. See Alexander Kelle. Discourses on the Securitisation of Public Health – a Survey of Four
Countries (2006), available at: {http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/regrev/kelle_securitisationPH.pdf}
accessed on 11 March 2009)
43 J Rushton, R Viscarra, E Guerne Bleich and A McLeod, ‘Impact of avian influenza outbreaks in
the poultry sectors of five South East Asian countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Thailand,
Viet Nam) outbreak costs, responses and potential long term control’, World’s Poultry Science
Journal, 61 (2005), pp. 492–93.
44 Ibid., pp. 496, 499.
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the epicentre of human and avian cases of H5N1 influenza.45 Therefore, the threat
which they faced from avian influenza, although it peaked at diﬀerent times, can
be said to be roughly similar for the purposes of a macro level political discussion.
For a study which seeks to interrogate the ‘facilitating conditions’ of political
legitimacy, audience acceptance and claims to ‘securityness’, the comparability of
the threat faced by the two polities is important.
Equally important is that the states under consideration have some important
diﬀerences in their political structure and processes, the role of civil society and the
media, and the domestic and international legitimacy of their leaders. We do not
claim to make definitive causal statements about the relationship between such
variables and the degree and nature of H5N1 securitisation during the period under
analysis. Rather, by investigating these ‘non-threat facilitating conditions’ we
provide empirical evidence on the fraught nature of securitising processes outside
the Western-democratic state, and outline future avenues for research on the
securitisation of infectious disease in those environments.
Throughout the case studies, speech acts, resource allocations, administrative
changes, policy ‘action’, and audience ‘reaction’ are used as indicators of the
process of securitisation. This approach does not seek to provide proof that avian
influenza has, or has not been securitised ‘successfully’; rather it places the
securitising moves (or lack thereof) of the government against the role of political
structures and audience reactions in influencing the overall outcome of health
securitisation.
Vietnam
Since 2003, Vietnam has suﬀered two major outbreaks of the H5N1 virus in
humans, corresponding to the northern hemisphere winter and spring.46 The first,
occurring in the first few months of 2004, resulted in 23 human cases of the disease.
The second, occurring from late 2004 until the middle of 2005, resulted in a further
62 cases. From December 2005, Vietnam reported no cases of human infection for
almost two years, before a small number of isolated cases since July 2007.
Importantly, while the human cases form the nexus of concern for the WHO
and GISN, the epidemic has a far greater reach amongst Vietnam’s poultry
industry and domestic waterfowl. Vietnam’s traditional agricultural system is
uniquely suited to sustained, and sometimes undetectable, transmission of the
H5N1 virus amongst birds.47 Not surprisingly, outbreaks amongst poultry have
been a regular feature of Vietnam’s provinces since 2003, even when no new human
cases were emerging. At one point, 20 per cent of the country’s poultry were
45 World Health Organisation, WHO/WPRO – Oﬃcially Confimed Human Influenza A/H5N1 Cases
(23 August 2007), available at: {http://www.wpro.who.int/sites/csr/data/data_Tables.htm} accessed on
31 August 2007.
46 Data extracted from World Health Organisation, WHO/WPRO – Human Avian Influenza A/H5N1
Cases by Onset Date, available at: {http://www.wpro.who.int/sites/csr/data/data_Graphs.htm} accessed
10 September 2007.
47 Alessandro Cristalli and Ilaria Capua, ‘Practical Problems in Controlling H5N1 High Pathogenicity
Avian Influenza at Village Level in Vietnam and Introduction of Biosecurity Measures’, Avian
Diseases, 51 (2007), p. 462.
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slaughtered in an eﬀort to control the disease – a massive blow to the short-term
economic stability of rural agricultural areas, where 80 per cent of Vietnam’s
population resides.48
The Vietnamese government’s response to the outbreak of avian influenza
started slowly. In 2003, as the first sporadic cases of H5N1 influenza appeared,
provincial governments struggled to identify the disease and notify central and
international authorities.49 Likely to a combination of deliberate bureaucratic
obfuscation and a lack of capacity, the response to these initial avian and
human outbreaks in disparate provinces was sluggish and pursued through an
under-resourced public health apparatus.50
However, once the gravity and scale of the outbreak became apparent – and
impossible to quarantine from the oversight of international organisations – in
January 2004, eﬀorts to securitise the disease were swift. Chairing a Politburo-level
National Steering Committee on Avian Influenza, the Prime Minister demanded
that the epidemic be contained by the end of February through a widespread
culling programme, which would involve ‘all State apparatuses and administrative
bodies of all levels’.51 From this point forward, the Vietnamese central govern-
ment’s rhetoric and the tone of its response remained remarkably consistent. From
2004 until 2008 security language was frequently invoked, comparatively large
budgetary allocations were made and the central government reinforced its control
by limiting resistance to emergency measures. Its cooperation with the WHO and
OIE, although occasionally plagued by capacity constraints, was also consistently
good.52
In the context of an ongoing and severe avian epidemic, the government’s
domestic rhetoric surrounding bird flu since February 2004 has been highly
securitised, and focused on placing the economic wellbeing of the Vietnamese state
as the referent object. In May 2005, after multiple bouts of culling in infected
areas, the Vietnamese government began an extraordinary eﬀort to vaccinate all
212 million poultry in the country against H5N1 subtypes with a view to
minimising the economic impact of the outbreaks.53 However, despite the initiation
of this eﬀort, avian epidemics continued to occur in the northern and southern
river deltas in late 2005. The response to these avian epidemics is indicative of the
types of securitising moves which were made. Throughout this period, newspaper
articles about the poultry farms aﬀected by the virus and the government’s
control eﬀorts appeared daily; variously referring to avian influenza as an
‘imminent danger’, a ‘deadly threat’ to Vietnam, or even a ‘global threat’.54 Such
48 See Ministry of Health (MOH) and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD),
Vietnam: Integrated National Plan for Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness and Response (Vietnam: Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2006), p. 1.
49 Tuong Vu, The Political Economy of Avian Influenza Response and Control in Vietnam, STEPS
Working Paper 19 (Brighton: STEPS Centre, 2009), p. 15.
50 Dennis Normile, ‘Vietnam Battles Bird Flu . . . and Critics’, Science, 309 (2005) p. 368.
51 ‘Prompt action ordered to contain bird flu’, Saigon Times Daily (9 February 2004); ‘Gov’t acts
strongly against bird flu – Int’l organizations help Vietnam fight epidemic’, Saigon Times Daily
(5 February 2004).
52 Normile, ‘Vietnam Battles Bird Flu’, pp. 368–70.
53 Hong Van, ‘Ministry requests VND100 billion to vaccinate fowls’, Saigon Times Daily (26 May
2005).
54 Son Nguyen, ‘Awareness the key deadlock’, Saigon Times Daily (4 November 2005); Hong Van and
Bac Cuong, ‘Ten Provinces Report Bird Flu, Pandemic Feared Nearing’, Saigon Times Daily (14
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pronouncements underscored the government’s desire to ‘mobilise the entire
political system’ in the ‘fight against the H5N1-virus’.55 High pressure statements
were followed by regulations and directives,56 including one from the Prime
Minister which sought to mobilise the state, its security forces, its citizens and
every resource available against the threat:
The formulation and implementation of such urgent action plans (against bird flu) must be
considered an unexpected and urgent task of Party committees and administrations of all
levels and a duty of each citizen and, therefore, the strength of the whole political system
should be mobilized for this task [. . .] To take initiative in making all necessary
preparations and mobilizing every resource to prevent and combat the type-A (H5N1)
influenza among humans [. . .] the Ministry of Health, concerned ministries and branches
and localities shall guide all medical units and establishments (even the army and police
forces) from the central to provincial, municipal, district and communal levels.57
Typical of the media statements and directives during subsequent avian outbreaks
in 2006 and 2007, such language was indicative of the Vietnamese government’s
conviction that ‘the fight against bird flu is an uninterrupted war’.58 The urgency
with which the government sought to act is, in our view, a product of the avian
epidemic’s potential to impact negatively upon the legitimacy of the government
amongst both international and domestic audiences.
The 2002 and 2003 SARS epidemic taught the Vietnamese government valuable
lessons about its ability control information flows to the international community
and consequently control its image as a good-faith actor in the global public health
sphere. In particular, the praise it received for openly and competently controlling
the epidemic stood in strong contrast to the opprobrium over China’s evasive-
ness.59 This resonates with the empirical evidence suggesting that, although
Vietnamese oﬃcials tried to quietly deal with the initial, small-scale avian
outbreaks in mid-2003, they began cooperating with the WHO and international
community at the point at which the outbreaks became a national (and hence
potentially international) problem. Reinforcing this logic was the need to appear
competent to avoid severe consequences for the tourism industry and foreign direct
investment.
The pressures from the international sphere appear to coincide with domestic
sources with the potential to threaten domestic political legitimacy. Since the late
1980s, the legitimacy of one-party communist rule has been increasingly linked to
its ability to bring economic prosperity and development to Vietnam, a phenomena
November 2005); and Hong Van and Minh Ngoc, ‘Retailers in city plan to take poultry meat oﬀ
shelves’, Saigon Times Daily (9 November 2005).
55 Bac Cuong and Hong Van, ‘Gov’t meets to lay out emergency plan to fight bird flu’, Saigon Times
Daily (18 October 2005); and Hong Van, ‘City, neighbouring provinces join forces to bird flu’,
Saigon Times Daily (25 November 2005).
56 Cuong and Van, ‘Gov’t meets to lay out emergency plan to fight bird flu’; Son Nguyen, ‘More
resources needed to contain bird flu’, The Saigon Times Daily (21 January 2005); Hong Van,
‘Vietnam culls 90,000 fowls in one day’, Saigon Times Daily (30 November 2005); ‘Fight against bird
flu continues’, Vietnam News Agency Bulletin (27 April 2005); and ‘Deputy PM calls on people to
fight bird flu’, Vietnam News Agency Bulletin (13 March 2007).
57 Bracketed comments are from original Resolution 15/2005/NQ-CP, ‘Resolution on Urgent Measures
to Prevent the Avian Influenza Epidemic (H5N1) and Type-A (H5N1) Human Influenza Pandemic’,
(Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2005).
58 ‘Deputy PM calls on people to fight bird flu’, Vietnam News Agency Bulletin (13 March 2007).
59 Fiona Fleck, ‘How SARS changed the world in less than six months’, Bulletin of the World Health
Organisation, 81 (2003), p. 626.
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known as ‘performance legitimacy’.60 Through the process of doi moi, Vietnam’s
version of economic liberalisation, the maintenance of economic growth has
become central to the stability of the Communist Party.61 As the demographics of
Vietnam shift towards a population base which does not recall the nationalist
struggle of the mid-twentieth century, the ability to provide stability and economic
progress is becoming increasingly central to continued Vietnamese Communist
Party legitimacy.62 For Vietnam’s elites, threats to this growth destablise the
current political order and consequently economic crises are met with large
resource allocations and mobilisations of the apparatus of government.
Given the political and social context of Vietnam just outlined, it is unsurpris-
ing that the economy was made the referent object of a number of the securitising
speech acts made by government oﬃcials. The Green Book highlighted ‘large-scale
loss of life and livelihoods’ as the primary threat posed by a human influenza
pandemic, but then re-iterated that ‘the eﬀects of sickness and mortality on
potential output’ would be the first-order concern of the government.63 Control
programmes to stem the avian epidemic were framed as a cost-benefit analysis
against short and long-term economic hardship, not the potential loss of life. The
reasoning for a widespread cull of all poultry in and around Hanoi in November
of 2005, as enunciated by one of the Deputy Prime Ministers, was that:
a potential pandemic would damage not only Vietnam’s agriculture but also ‘almost all
other fields,’ he said. The threat of a bird flu epidemic and a potential human pandemic
was ‘clear before our eyes,’ Dzung stressed, adding that Vietnam would use all resources to
fight them ‘even if it hurt growth’.64
These declarations, designed both to shore up legitimacy and exercise control, were
followed by consistent injections of money and energy by the central government.
The Prime Minister himself frequently chaired the control programme committee,
and his two Deputies were each given responsibility for control in the North and
the South respectively.65
The centralised nature of Vietnam’s bureaucracy is a key factor in the apparent
success of the securitisation discourse and implementation of control measures.
When limited pockets of dissent presented themselves in the Southern Mekong
delta, primarily amongst provincial oﬃcials seeking to limit the impact of control
measures on the livelihoods of rural producers, the intervention of a Deputy Prime
Minister instituted even tougher measures than previously mandated.66
Financially, between 2006 and 2007, the Vietnamese government allocated US
$266 million to control both the agricultural and human health implications of the
H5N1 epidemic.67 This represented an increase of almost a fifth on the total health
60 Zachary Abuza, Renovating politics in contemporary Vietnam (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2001), p. 21.
61 Regina M Abrami, ‘Vietnam in 2002: On the Road to Recovery’, Asian Survey, 43 (2003), p. 91.
62 Abuza, Renovating politics in contemporary Vietnam, p. 22.
63 See Ministry of Health (MOH) and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD),
Integrated National Operational Program for Avian and Human Influenza (Vietnam: Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, 2006), p. i.
64 ‘Flu pandemic could kill more people than expected: Deputy PM’, Thanh Nien Daily (9 November
2005).
65 See MOH and MARD, Integrated National Operational Program, p. 7.
66 Nguyen, ‘More resources needed to contain bird flu’.
67 MOH and MARD, Vietnam: Integrated National Plan for Avian Influenza Control, p. 11.
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budget for each year, and dwarfed the resource allocations to other diseases of
concern such as tuberculosis and HIV, which received US $10 and US $5 million
respectively.68 The bulk of this allocation has been spent on a highly eﬀective
campaign of area-culling of poultry, including a well funded compensation
programme for citizens who lost poultry (and thus a large slice of their livelihood)
to the control eﬀorts.69 If we are to take resource allocation as an indicator of
commitment to control programmes, and the urgency of the task, then the
Vietnamese central government was strongly committed to implementing its
securitising rhetoric.
In the language of traditional representations of securitisation theory, Vietnam-
ese leaders made a claim that avian influenza existentially threatened the economic
security of Vietnam, and this necessitated emergency measures to contain the
disease.70
While it is diﬃcult to accurately assess the degree of resistance to government
policy within a state whose media is heavily controlled, sporadic episodes of
resistance at the provincial and village level seem to have occurred.71 The tension
between enacting proper control measures and limiting their economic impact
(which was concentrated in the poor, rural areas of Vietnam – a traditional support
base for the Communist Party) is one of the primary reasons for these episodes of
resistance. Recent work has identified significant tension amongst central policy
dictates and the actions of local bureaucrats, particularly in the Southern provinces
surrounding Ho Chi Minh City.72 These instances of resistance to the central
government’s control programmes by provincial bureaucrats and their constituents,
rather than derailing the securitising acts of the government, precipitated the swift
intervention of the State and Party apparatus and a re-doubling of rhetorical and
bureaucratic discipline.73
Overall, the balance of evidence indicates that the Vietnamese central govern-
ment initiated a process of securitisation, and that strong control measures were
pursued by the central government in order to meet the declared threat.
Furthermore, the processes, and their outcomes, were heavily influenced by the fact
68 World Health Organisation, Global Tuberculosis Control: Surveillance, Planning, Financing – WHO
Report 2007 (Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2007), pp. 153, 156; and Joint UN Programme
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and World Health Organisation, AIDS Epidemic Update – December 2006
(Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2006), p. 30. The authors are aware that PEPFAR funding of
up to US $36 million was provided to Vietnam during the same period, but this was targeted aid
rather than an investment from existing government revenue.
69 Area-culling involves the practice of identifying cases of avian influenza in poultry and then
destroying all poultry within a certain radius of the infected flock (usually 3–5km), regardless of
whether they exhibit signs of infection.
70 It is diﬃcult to reconcile the notion of economic prosperity being ‘existentially threatened’, indeed
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde acknowledge the controversy in their chapter on economic referents in
Security. Although ‘economic loss. . .(is). . .part of the ordinary business of life, it is a matter not of
degree but of a possible collapse of welfare’ (Buzan et al., Security, p. 102); in this sense, the claim
made by the Vietnamese government is consistent with the use of the term ‘existentially threatened’
as described by Buzan et al.
71 Hong Van, ‘Neighbors clash over poultry transport precautions’, The Saigon Times Daily (14
Janaury 2005); Vu, The Political Economy of Avian Influenza in Vietnam, p. 46.
72 Vu, The Political Economy of Avian Influenza in Vietnam, p. 46.
73 Vu’s recent study highlights this ongoing tension, but re-aﬃrms that ‘tough measures’ were taken by
the central government, in some cases to the detriment of disease control policies (ibid.). Also see
Hong Van, ‘Health Oﬃcial Calls for More International Aid’, Saigon Times Daily (3 November
2005).
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that by controlling the disease, the Vietnamese Communist Party was able to
reinforce its control of social order and protect political legitimacy.
Indonesia
In contrast to the unified and swift response of the Vietnamese government, the
Indonesian government has seemingly taken little action domestically, while
demanding international assistance to deal with the eﬀects of a pandemic.
Statements by government oﬃcials to domestic media sources alternatively denied
the existence of the epidemic, downplayed its impact or recommended control
programmes which were largely ineﬀective. In contrast, the approach taken when
dealing with international organisations has been to emphasise the threat of a
pandemic and to use whatever political or material leverage possible to urge the
securitisation of the problem of vaccine availability.
Since 2003, Indonesia has experienced a widespread epidemic of H5N1 amongst
its poultry and domestic birds.74 From a human health perspective, the archipelago
has also produced some of the most alarming statistics and cases of human
infection with the strain since its emergence in Hong Kong in 1997. Since 2005, 141
human cases of the disease have been reported by Indonesia, 115 of which have
been fatal.75 These cases have included a major ‘cluster’ in the province of
Northern Sumatra, which was likely caused by human-to-human transmission of
the virus between family members who had no contact with infected poultry.76
Despite the ferocity of the initial outbreak, and in contrast to Vietnam’s frank
and honest approach to the reporting of the disease to the GISN, Indonesia instead
reported outbreaks of avian flu as Newcastle disease – a devastating poultry disease
but crucially without the ability to infect humans. This misreporting, allegedly
performed at the behest of poultry industry pressure, was a key feature of
Indonesia’s early response to the epidemic and was only discontinued late in
January 2004.77
From this beginning, the tone and substance of Indonesia’s reaction to avian
influenza was set, and has continued throughout the epidemic. The Agriculture
Ministry, at various times, declared that the strain of H5N1 in Indonesia was
incapable of being transmitted from poultry to humans.78 Spokespersons addition-
ally implied that the primary responsibility for control lay with the under-resourced
74 Sedyaningsih, Isfandari, Setiawaty, Rifati, Harun, Purba, Imari, Giriputra, Blair, Putnam, Uyeki and
Soendoro, ‘Epidemiology of Cases of H5N1 Virus Infection in Indonesia, July 2005–June 2006’,
Journal of Infectious Diseases, 196 (2007), p. 522; and Smith, Naipospos, Nguyen, de Jong,
Vijaykrishna, Usman, Hassan, Nguyen, Dao, Bui, Leung, Cheung, Rayner, Zhang, Poon, Li,
Nguyen, Hien, Farrar, Webster, Chen, Peris and Guan, ‘Evolution and adaptation of H5N1
influenza virus in avian and human hosts in Indonesia and Vietnam’, Virology, 350 (2006), p. 264.
75 World Health Organisation, Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza
A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO, available at: {http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/
cases_table_2009_03_30/en/index.html accessed 3 April 2008.
76 Yang Yang, M Elizabeth Halloran, Jonathan D Sugimoto and Ira M Longini, ‘Detecting
Human-to-Human Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1)’, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 13
(2007).
77 Rendi A Witular, ‘Govt confirms bird flu after long cover-up’, Jakarta Post (26 January 2004),
p. 1.
78 The bird flu scare’, Jakarta Post (27 January 2004), p. 6.
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provincial authorities and claimed that only visibly infected poultry needed to be
culled.79
These statements were reinforced by Indonesian resource allocations to control
programmes. For the years 2006 and 2007, some of the severest periods of the
epidemic so far, average government expenditure on avian influenza control was
only US $57.5 million, or 1.7 per cent of the US $3.5 billion of government health
expenditure in 2006.80 Institutional attention and support to control programmes
has also been very weak. The belated creation of a ‘National Commission on
Avian Influenza Control’ in 2006 was supposed to enable new levels of coopera-
tion between ministries and provincial authorities.81 Although composed of the
majority of the Indonesian cabinet it possessed neither Presidential nor provincial
involvement and hence lacked priority as an important domestic issue.82
Coupled with the relative passivity of the Indonesian government’s domestic
response was an active resistance campaign emanating from, and structured by,
domestic political relationships. The most salient examples of overt bureaucratic
resistance to securitising moves have come from the Agriculture Ministry of the
Indonesian government.83 This is perhaps best illustrated by the dismissal of the
National Director for Animal Health (well respected in the international animal
health community); after she made allegations that bird flu outbreaks had been
‘secretly contained’ at the behest of poultry industry insiders with personal ties to
senior Agriculture Ministry oﬃcials.84 Significant resistance to central directives
and culling operations was also demonstrated by district oﬃcials, in many cases
denying the severity or existence of the disease in their area.85 As Paul Forster
notes in his recent study of the politics of avian influenza in Indonesia, ‘national
guidelines are only implemented when local oﬃcials think it is necessary and have
the funds and local support to do so’.86 In this way, the locally powerful district
oﬃcials acted as filters, selectively reinforcing or contradicting potential securitising
acts by the central government.
In contrast to the domestic situation, the Indonesian government performed a
number of securitising moves on the international stage. In particular, the
government embarked upon a policy of withholding H5N1 virus samples extracted
79 Zakki P Hakim, ‘Bird flu in RI limited to poultry only, for now’, Jakarta Post (6 October 2004),
p. 13; LKBN Antara, ‘Regional Govts Spearheads of Fight Against Bird Flu, Minister Says’, LKBN
Antara (15 February 2006); and LKBN Antara, ‘Agriculture Minister: Only H5N1 virus infected
poultry to be culled’, LKBN Antara (21 February 2006).
80 LKBN Antara, ‘WB Regrets Cut in Funds for Bird Flu Control in Indonesia’, LKBN Antara
(24 August 2006); and World Bank, Spending for Development: Making the Most of Indonesia’s New
Opportunities – Indonesia Public Expenditure Review 2007 (Washington: World Bank, 2007), p. 56.
81 Arie Rukmantara, ‘Committee to Prevent Pandemic’, Jakarta Post (7 January 2006), p. 2.
82 Indonesian National Committee for Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness,
Committee Membership, available at: {http://www.komnasfbpi.go.id/aboutuscom_eng.html} accessed
11 September 2007.
83 ‘Minister: Govt Not to Change Policy to Combat Bird Flu’, LKBN Antara (28 March 2006); R. A
Witular, ‘Mass Cull Unfeasible: Minister’, Jakarta Post (12 November 2005), p. 1; E. C Komandjaja,
‘WHO Urges Solid Action Plan to Prevent Bird Flu’, Jakarta Post (21 February 2004), p. 4.
84 Alan Sipress, ‘Indonesia Neglected Bird Flu until Too Late, Experts Say’, Washington Post
(20 October 2005), p. A01.
85 ‘Caging bird flu’, Jakarta Post (21 September 2005), p. 6; Sari P. Setiogi and Multa Fidrus, ‘Bird flu
outbreak devastating small poultry farms’, The Jakarta Post (13 February 2004), p. 3; ‘Certain
regions not handling bird flu seriously: President’, LKBN Antara (28 November 2005).
86 Paul Forster, The Political Economy of Avian Influenza in Indonesia, STEPS Working Paper 17,
(Brighton: STEPS Centre, 2009).
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from Indonesian patients from the world scientific community. This violated the 55
year old influenza virus sharing agreement at the heart of the GISN pandemic alert
and surveillance programme and caused significant consternation within the WHO
and the scientific community more broadly.87 By breaking such an agreement,
Indonesia sought to accelerate the accommodation of its demands for more access
to vaccines and antivirals. It declared, through its actions, that emergency measures
were required to force a solution to inequitable distribution of the benefits of the
GISN.
This securitising act was reinforced and explained by subsequent speech acts
directed towards the international community. Speaking at the World Health
Assembly (WHA), the peak representative body of the WHO, Indonesian Health
Minister Supari suggested that inequalities in vaccine production capacity between
the developed and the developing world would result in unjustifiable inequalities in
the distribution of vaccines and would undermine ‘the battle we have to wage
against the pandemic threat’ and that ‘the unfairness (sic) [. . .] could threaten
global health security’.88 She justified Indonesia’s withdrawal from the virus-
sharing system on the grounds that Indonesia would receive no benefit, in terms of
access to vaccines, from participation in GISN and in a subsequent book claimed
that the lack of transparency within GISN meant that the Indonesian virus samples
could potentially be used for biological weapons research.89 Indeed, the securiti-
sation of avian influenza at a global level was challenged directly by Supari, when
she declared that ‘the current unfair access to vaccines worsens the global
inequality between the rich and the poor, between the North and the South – and
I think that is more dangerous than a pandemic’.90 Indonesia subse-
quently demanded, and achieved, the establishment of an international pan-
demic vaccine stockpile to be allocated to developing nations in the event of a
pandemic.91
The statements of the Indonesian government have thus been directed at, and
distinguished for, two audiences: on the one hand the domestic constituency and
on the other the international community. The two seemingly contradictory policy
routes are, in our view, driven by the political situation within Indonesia as well
as the international discourse of ‘health security’.
The key domestic factor in Indonesia’s governance of the avian influenza
problem has been the inability to garner support for emergency measures from its
provincial and district governments. This is not a new problem for Indonesia, and
much has been written regarding it, but it is especially salient in the context of
87 Martin Enserink, ‘Indonesia Earns Flu Accord At World Health Assembly’, Science, 316 (2007), The
Lancet, ‘Global solidairty needed in preparing for pandemic influenza’, The Lancet, 369 (2007).
88 Siti Fadilah Supari, Statement by the Minister of Health of the Republic of Indonesia H.E Dr Siti
Fadilah Supari at the 60th World Health Assembly, available at: {http://www.mission-indonesia.org/
modules/news.php?lang=en&newsid=154&PHPSESSID=4af1c5827352dcbde4a38f046688c368}
accessed 8 October 2007; William New, WHO Kicks Oﬀ Talks On Flu Pandemic, Benefits, Access To
Vaccines, available at: {http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2007/11/21/who-kicks-oﬀ-talks-on-flu-
pandemic-benefits-access-to-vaccines/} accessed on 12 March 2008.
89 Mark Forbes, ‘US dismisses bird flu claims’, Sydney Morning Herald (21 February 2008), p. 9,
Enserink, ‘Indonesia Earns Flu Accord At World Health Assembly’. See n. 73 above.
90 Brian Walsh, Indonesia’s Bird Flu Showdown, available at: {http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
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Vuori’s criticisms of the securitisation framework.92 Since the end of the Suharto
regime in 1999, the archipelago has undertaken democratic reforms, decentralisation
of power to the districts, and has struggled with the eﬀects of a number of separatist
movements.93 Of these reforms, the decentralisation process has likely had the
biggest impact upon Indonesia’s capacity to control disease outbreaks, not least
because authority over public health issues was among the first of the administrative
responsibilities that were devolved to the control of the 456 autonomous districts.94
Hadiz argues that the process of decentralisation (undertaken to settle
secessionist tendencies and promote accountability) has resulted in serious confu-
sion over authority, revenue and responsibility within Indonesia’s government.95
The result of this process, within the context of avian influenza, has been tension
between the Agricultural and Health bureaucracies – with Agriculture ultimately
assuming a dominant role in, and antagonistic relationship towards, the admin-
istration of poultry culling programmes.96 Additionally, devolution of power to the
districts has allowed for local power structures and interest groups, many of whom
rely economically on the poultry industry, to regain influence and shape not only
the policy of provincial governments, but also that of the central bureaucracy.97
Indeed, pressure to minimise culling operations seems to have been brought upon
provincial governors by the poultry industry.98 In this way, decentralisation of
political legitimacy in the area of public health, and weak or antagonistic
relationships between central and provincial authorities have had a profound
impact upon the securitisation process in Indonesia.
Health Minister Supari herself alluded to the diﬃculty in creating policy
consensus in a state plagued by internal governance tensions. Asked whether she
accepted the criticism of many international observers that Indonesia had not done
enough to stem the epidemic, she replied:
Vietnam, as a centralised socialist country, can get high compliance on national policies
and so has succeeded, for example, in implementing rapid culling of birds [. . .] In contrast,
Indonesia is in transition towards a decentralized democracy after three decades of
authoritarian national rule. We are still on a learning curve, and compliance of the
relatively independent regional authorities with national policies is often poor.99
The result, explored here, has been paralysis when local political priorities did not
coincide with central public health policy, or when central bureaucracies could not
92 For more on the problems of decentralisation see Vedi R Hadiz, ‘Power and Politics in North
Sumatra: The Uncompleted Reformasi’, in Aspinall and Fealy (eds), Local Power and Politics in
Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2003); and Vedi R Hadiz, ‘Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of
Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives’, Development and Change, 35 (2004).
93 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia (Santa
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), pp. 2–3.
94 Ibid., p. 48.
95 Hadiz, ‘Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia’, p. 708.
96 ‘Health Minister Calls for Poultry Ban in Cities’, Jakarta Post (19 February 2006), p. 1; ‘Stamping
Out of Poultry Only at Highly Infected Farms’, LKBN Antara (20 September 2005); and ‘Minister:
Govt Not to Change Policy to Combat Bird Flu’, LKBN Antara (28 March 2006).
97 Minako Sakai, ‘The Privatisation of Padang Cement: Regional Identity and Economic Hegemony in
the New Era of Decentralisation’, in Aspinall and Fealy (eds), Local Power and Politics in Indonesia:
Decentralisation and Democratisation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 160.
98 ‘Agriculture Minister: Only H5N1 virus infected poultry to be culled’; and ‘Regional Govts
Spearheads of Fight Against Bird Flu, Minister Says’, LKBN Antara.
99 Declan Butler, ‘Q & A: Siti Fadilah Supari’, Nature, 450 (2007).
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come to a consensus. In short, the possibility for action to contain the epidemic,
through securitisation of the epidemic for a domestic audience and mobilisation
of the internal power structures, was severely inhibited by domestic political
concerns.
Coupled with an inability to act domestically was the Indonesian government’s
eﬀort to divert the securitisation of avian influenza towards the securitisation of
vaccine access. A deep post-colonial rhetoric has been a hallmark of Indonesian
politics since independence; a civic-nationalism defined largely by external threats
was frequently invoked throughout the Sukarno/Suharto years in order to bind the
fractious state together. Such a tool remains attractive to Indonesia’s modern
leaders as they struggle to imprint their legitimacy on the disparate districts.100
Such political predispositions underlie Indonesia’s justification for withholding
virus samples; whereby it claimed that the developed world was (once again)
exploiting its resources.101 In this sense, the interplay of domestic factors with
global pressure to act produced a set of policy outcomes wholly divergent from
those seen in Vietnam.
Case analysis: legitimacy, referents and audiences
The above empirical analysis supports the proposition that state and sub-state
factors are fundamentally important to the implementation of the global discourse
of public health security. In particular we identify, along with recent empirical
work independent to our own, that decentralisation and national discourses of
political legitimacy may have played a critical role in the disease control eﬀorts of
both states.102 Of critical importance are the composition of the audience, and the
situating of both actor and audience in political and social contexts. Our analysis
has implications for the success of the global health security discourse, as well as
the utility of the securitisation framework in assessing the construction of security
issues in non-democratic, transitional and non-European contexts. Whether or not
both countries constitute a ‘positive’ case of securitisation, it is clear that they have
responded to the international discourse which links security with infectious disease
in diﬀerent ways. Their policy responses to avian influenza, some of which have
invoked security, have been markedly diﬀerent. Indeed, there appears to be a
degree of contestation over, not only the response to the threat, but the nature and
severity of the threat itself. It is therefore useful to disaggregate this process to
better understand the interplay between actors, referent objects, and the audiences
with which securitising actors interact.
100 David Brown, ‘Why might constructed nationalist and ethnic ideologies come into confrontation
with each other?’, The Pacific Review, 15 (2002), p. 566.
101 The legal reasoning behind the decision to withhold samples relied on the Convention on Biological
Diversity – which asserts the rights of nations not to have their biosphere exploited, and protects
them from the practice of pharmaceutical companies manufacturing unaﬀordable drugs from
compounds found in a countries flora or fauna. For a critique of this reasoning, see David P Fidler,
‘Influenza Virus Sample Sharing, International Law, and Global Health Diplomacy’, Emerging
Infectious Diseases, 14 (2008).
102 Forster, Avian Influenza in Indonesia; and Vu, Avian Influenza Response and Control in Vietnam.
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Legitimacy
Key to our analysis is the issue of political and linguistic legitimacy – both as a
facilitating condition of securitisation and, following from the critiques, a
motivation for, and benefit of, securitisation. As Stritzel notes, ‘actors may have
some sort of oﬃcial, delegated or enforced, ability to define meaning so that their
power capacity may come close to a monopoly’.103 In the case of Vietnam, the
state did have this monopoly, articulated through the Party, which utilised and also
bolstered the rhetoric force of its legitimacy as the economic provider for the
nation. However, the contingent nature of this oﬃcial linguistic power is illustrated
by the case of Indonesia, where political sensitivities over policy imposition by the
central government, devolution of political power to district leaders and the active
resistance of sections of the bureaucracy stifled the coherency (perhaps the
initiation) of securitising moves. Simply because governments traditionally possess
(and sometimes monopolise) the political legitimacy to articulate security speech,
does not mean that this legitimacy can be universally assumed.
The search for political legitimacy can also motivate securitising moves.
Vietnam has utilised its greater bureaucratic unity and centralised power structure
to securitise in order to safeguard the ‘performance legitimacy’ of the government.
Borne of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s tight association with the state, the
securitisation process was, on the surface, relatively similar to that described by a
paradigmatic version of the Copenhagen School. However, the motivations behind
the securitisation of avian influenza, and the clear use of it as a strategic
manoeuvre to shore up the threatened legitimacy of the domestic political system,
are not well accounted for by the traditional models. A better explanation draws
from what Vuori calls ‘securitisation for legitimating past acts of the securitising
actor’ – in this case reaﬃrming a publicly responsible decision-maker, where ‘the
audience is the evaluator of political legitimacy’.104
As the leaders of a transitional and fractious democratic state, the central
government of Indonesia may also have been seeking to safeguard domestic
political legitimacy. A securitised response to the epidemic, which coerced
provincial and local governments, bypassing the ‘normal’ processes of political
bargaining, would have undercut the foundations of the central government’s
political legitimacy in the post-Suharto environment. However, externalisation of
the threat by moving the focus from provincial farming practices to international
vaccine inequalities avoids the domestic political sensitivities (particularly regarding
‘Javanese domination’) and structural impediments (such as that of decentralisation
previously discussed) while oﬀering potential benefits. Post-colonial rhetoric has, in
the past, been a key foundation of the unity of the Indonesian state.105 Therefore,
one avenue to demonstrate authority and legitimacy was to re-cast the security
threat in the international arena.
In this respect, the motivation for a securitising act and the ability to perform
it coincide. The contested politics of possessing the legitimacy to make a
securitising move are less evident in international forums. In the international
103 Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization’, p. 372.
104 Vuori, ‘Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization’, pp. 73, 75.
105 Robert Elson, The Idea of Indonesia: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008),
p. 53.
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environment, states, by the very fact of being states, possess the legitimacy to
articulate security threats.106 International organisations, operating on the assump-
tion of a unitary Westphalian state, are fertile ground for states to make claims
about ‘their’ security interests regardless of whether the constituency they speak for
is unitary or whether it has legitimated the state’s interpretation of security. A
state’s legitimacy to speak for ‘itself’ (and the implied unitary ‘it’ which that
represents) is assumed. Thus, while unable to operationalise the international
discourse of health security domestically, the Indonesian government was able to
pursue a policy which sought to securitise the problem of vaccine availability.
This problematises the utility of international discourses which attempt to
generalise the link between avian influenza and international security. While, the
discourse of ‘public health security’ is established at the international level, it
requires implementation at the domestic and local levels. In the Vietnamese case,
pressures from the international sphere coincided with core state interests and
domestic sources of political legitimacy, such as protecting economic growth, and
maintaining their reputation as competent managers of health emergencies (SARS
and H5N1). In the Indonesian case, although the need for action established by the
WHO discourse of ‘health security’ was potentially recognised by the Indonesian
government, they lacked the ability to fully operationalise this discourse in the
domestic environment. In this sense, the path of least resistance for the Indonesian
central government was to use its foreign policy freedom (and sovereign legitimacy)
at the WHA to cajole the international community into providing domestically
appealing forms of aid (such as antivirals and access to pandemic vaccines).
This situation challenges the logic of the original securitisation agenda at the
World Health Organisation. Rather than the discourse of health security forcing
countries to act because of the inherent danger that their ongoing outbreaks cause
to ‘international security’, the aﬀected countries have followed policy pathways
which are politically and materially viable; securitising infectious disease issues
when and how they are able to do so.
Implications of competing referents
The second major analytical focal point which arises from the cases is the choice
of referents which were appealed to by both governments. Attempts to securitise
global health discourses involve the securitisation of multiple and possibly
competing referent objects. The referent object of many of the WHO’s securitising
acts was ‘global public health’ (see the title of the 2007 World Health Report:
Global Public Health Security). For the Vietnamese, ‘economic growth’ was the
primary stated referent, but it is likely that such rhetoric stemmed from an
underlying need amongst Communist Party elites to protect the ‘performance
legitimacy’ of the Party and the Vietnamese political system more broadly. Finally,
the referent of the securitising speech acts emanating from the Indonesian
Government in the international arena cannot be clearly identified, and could
106 This is not to say that all securitising moves by states in international forums are accepted, merely
that they possess the legitimacy, formalised by instruments such as the UN charter, to ‘make the
claim’.
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broadly include claims regarding the threat to Indonesian sovereignty, the health
and welfare of its citizens, and the economic productivity of the poultry sector.
Such a milieu underscores the diﬃculty, perhaps incoherency, in seeking to
catalogue clearly definable referents which are valued by neatly delineated
audiences.
The influence of competing referents also challenges the eﬃcacy of the
international securitisation of public health. Once security responses are legitimated
in the context of infectious disease issues, then the operationalisation of that logic
is taken out of the hands of the original securitising actors. When local securitising
processes occur, reproducing international discourses, they will use referents and
language that are unique to the social and political context of the audience they are
trying to convince. These referents may be incompatible with the intent of those
which established the original securitisation and may be tied to the mechanisms of
state control and legitimation explored previously. The use of referents which
appeal to specific domestic audiences is not merely an exercise in gaining
acceptance of externally conceived policies. Rather, it has a profound eﬀect on the
qualities of subsequent policy and action. Motives for state control and the
mechanisms of that control are thus central in understanding implementation of
global health discourses at the domestic level.
The role of audience acceptance
This highlights the issue of audience acceptance and how that may proceed under
diﬀerent political structures. As noted above, securitising H5N1 globally requires
not only convincing state level elites that emergency action needs to be taken, but
that states such as Indonesia and Vietnam allocate the resources and organisational
capacity to respond, and that responses are suﬃcient to meet the threat. Domestic
securitisation in the Indonesian case involved engaging with the politics of elite
relationships between the centre and periphery, long known to be a challenge for
central Indonesian elites. In this sense, the Indonesia case illustrates how
centre-periphery relations and domestic political factors present in client patron
societies impact on the process of securitisation by influencing audience dialogue
and securitising rhetoric.
For example, provincial and village elites in Indonesia (and in other Southeast
Asian polities like Cambodia) are viewed as key sources of knowledge by local
people, and therefore they can hold a powerful place as ‘communicators’ to
traditional rural or agriculturally based constituencies.107 Provincial elites can be
seen therefore as ‘gatekeepers’ of interaction between central elites and provincial
constituencies potentially holding significant securitising power in choosing to
accept or resist securitising rhetoric. While similar relationships exist at the
commune and provincial level in Vietnam, these are mitigated by strong party
control of both the administrative apparatus and social movements such as the
107 See particularly the discussion (pp. 131–5) about relationships between rulers, elites and peasants in
Robert E Elson, ‘International Commerce, the State and Society: Economic and Social Change’, in
Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992).
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Vietnam Youth Union. This acts as a disciplining force, by rewarding dissemina-
tion of central messages and reducing the incentive to prioritise local concerns. In
this sense ‘audience’ acceptance should take into account the influential and
powerful role of provincial elites, and their relationship to the State, in what could
be described as a local politics of audience dialogue. Such dynamics do not fit well
into the ‘Westphalian straitjacket’ constricting securitisation theory. Situations
where people do not have the degree of access to other forms of information (such
as national or international media) as do audiences in democratic and industrial-
ised contexts, and where mobilising and expressing forms of dissent is diﬃcult, may
not fit into the paradigmatic understanding of securitisation theory.
Such social structures have implications not only for when and how audiences
‘accept’ a securitising act, but also for the act itself. The coherency of a securitising
act is reliant on a shared context between speaker and audience; where that context
is established by both historical experience and shared understanding of linguistic
meaning.108 In Indonesia, the peculiar social and political circumstances of the
audience altered the central government’s approach to the security implications of
the avian influenza epidemic. Furthermore, the post-colonial rhetoric contained in
both the speech and symbolic action of the government was a semantic repertoire
which could be readily and easily understood by the Indonesian polity. The process
in Indonesia thus highlights the truly inter-subjective and contingent nature of
securitising processes.
In Vietnam, our analysis concurs with aspects of Vuori’s analysis of the role of
‘audience acceptance’ in authoritarian polities. Securitising speech and action is
useful, not only to reproduce political order and to renew discipline where
challenges are evident (such as local resistance to poultry culling) but also to serve
as a form of communication between the VCP and the people.109 While securitising
H5N1 served a number of international and domestic political goals for the VCP,
the global public health message delivered to the masses by central and provincial
oﬃcials is arguably also a way for the VCP to build and maintain bonds with the
‘masses’ audience. Securitising H5N1 therefore serves a dual role: at the inter-
national level, to protect Vietnam’s reputation as competent regional citizen, and
at the domestic level, to legitimate the VCP as it ‘secures’ and ‘stabilises’ the
economy and populace from the ravages of avian influenza.
Implications for the health securitisation agenda
Given the importance of domestic factors in shaping policy responses, we believe
there are some stark implications for advocates of the health securitisation agenda.
The promise of framing avian influenza as a threat to international security was
that it would bypass the normal processes of contestation and compromise which
characterise the diﬀusion of global governance mechanisms into domestic policy. In
reality, the performative force of the global public health security discourse seems
to be heavily dependent on its alignment with domestic circumstances. In Vietnam,
108 Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization’, p. 183.
109 Vuori, ‘Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization’, p. 71.
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the demands of ‘international security’ coincided with pre-existing motivations for
‘regime security’; where securitising avian influenza served a number of domestic
and international political goals. Alternatively, as has seemed to be the case in
Indonesia, the logic of security can be distorted into a case for ignoring or
subverting the ‘global health security’ discourse itself. In eﬀect, Indonesia broke
free of the new ‘rules’ established by the initial securitisation of infectious disease
at the global level, which were themselves established by breaking free of
longstanding norms of humanitarianism.
Such an example underscores concerns regarding the basic precepts of
securitisation, which define security practice as a condition of exceptionality from
‘normality’.110 As Vuori suggests, and as we have found, actions which most
liberal-democratic states would regard as security practice can be highly normalised
in certain political and social contexts. In the international sphere, however,
security language is frequently invoked to emphasise the state’s right to pursue its
interests, ignore international practice and expect non-interference in its internal
aﬀairs. The resultant eﬀect of speaking security in an international context may
have been a rhetorical structure which promotes the use of drastic action contrary
to established international practice, in order to secure the position of the actor (in
this case the government of Indonesia). Rather than promoting a period of global
cooperation on health issues, our analysis suggests that securitising moves in the
cases above have encouraged the prioritisation of domestic political concerns and
reinforced realpolitik in international engagements on global health issues.
Further empirical work into the operationalisation of the global securitisation
of health is thus required in order to fully explore the methods and meanings
behind such securitisation. If, empirically, it is deemed that the global discourse of
health securitisation is being reproduced at the domestic level in ways counter-
productive to the good health of the world’s citizens, then caution should be
exercised in its extension.
Conclusion
Securitising global public health in general, and infectious disease in particular,
functions on the assumption that domestic states have the motivation and capacity
to enact policy change. Our case analysis has illustrated that a state’s desire and
capacity to securitise infectious disease is complex and can not be assumed. It is
beyond the scope of the article to analyse the complex causal relationships around
whether and how states like Indonesia and Vietnam ‘successfully’ securitised H5N1
or not. What our analysis has shown, however, is that local securitisation processes
that operationalise international public health discourses use referents and lan-
guage that are unique to the social and political context of the ‘audience’ they are
appealing to, and that these factors have important implications for subsequent
policy. Importantly, domestic referents of infectious disease may be incompatible
with the policy goals which underpin health securitisation at the international level.
We have illustrated that mechanisms of state control and legitimation are
110 Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization’, p. 367.
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important factors that influence and coopt moves to securitise at the domestic level.
We also identified important variances in the construction and identification of
audiences via our comparative analysis of transitional (Indonesia) and non-
democratic (Vietnam) cases. In doing so, we advocate a heightened awareness and
understanding of audience situatedness particularly in non-Western, non-
democratic and transitional states, to better grasp the policy challenges of
implementing global health discourses at the domestic level.
Theoretical critiques of securitisation have focused on deficiencies and tensions
in the basic articulations of the theory of securitisation, and how these operate
when applied to empirical cases.111 We believe, that while furthering the discussion
surrounding how securitisation can be operationalised, we are also calling into
question some of the assumptions underlying the fluidity of securitisation processes
between the international and domestic levels. As Hoogensen has argued, ‘new
security research is demonstrating that important articulations of security emanate
from sources other than the state and the international system.’112 The WHO’s role
in securitising infectious disease is a significant and important example. Our article
suggests that domestic political structures may have a more complex facilitating
role to play in the securitisation process than currently detailed in the Copenhagen
School’s securitisation framework. Further diﬀerentiation of the impact of
domestic political structures on securitisation processes is therefore an important
avenue for the ongoing development of securitisation studies.
111 For theoretical perspectives see Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization’; and Stritzel, ‘Towards
a Theory of Securitization’; and for empirical analyses of non-democratic, non-Western cases see
Vuori, ‘Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization’; and Wilkinson, ‘The Copenhagen School
on Tour in Kyrgyzstan’.
112 Hoogensen, ‘Bottoms Up! A Toast to Regional Security?’, p. 269.
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